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might depict a smiling face  overwritten with 
the word “sad”). Participants processed 
words significantly more quickly than facial 
expressions. Furthermore, different subre-
gions within the prefrontal cortex were 
recruited to suppress words compared to 
faces. We do not typically encounter faces 
with words on them (advertisements and 
the rare tattoo notwithstanding), so what is 
the significance of Ovaysikia et al.’s (2011) 
findings? The results challenge current 
theories about what kinds of informa-
tion dominates as we try make meaning of 
ambiguous input. They also call attention 
to a number of important questions about 
meaning-making that have received very lit-
tle attention in the neuroscience literature.
The findings challenge assumptions 
made by dual-process perspectives that 
currently dominate research on judgment 
in psychology, neuroscience, and econom-
ics. Dual-process perspectives suggest that 
we most typically make meaning (i.e., make 
a judgment) of ambiguous situations in a 
predictable, two-step process (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). We first use automatic, 
instinctual processes to estimate a possi-
ble meaning and then adjust our instincts 
using learned processes which are theorized 
to most often be relatively controlled. The 
findings in Ovaysikia et al.’s (2011) study 
are evidence that meaning-making using 
“instinctual” processes is not always quicker 
than “learned” processes. The researchers 
note that interpreting facial expressions 
is arguably more instinctual than read-
ing. Years before children learn to read, 
they spontaneously show interest in facial 
expressions compared to other objects 
(Mondloch et al., 1991) and can differentiate 
facial expressions of emotion for  guidance 
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As Leonardo Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa illus-
trates, ambiguity can be fascinating. Is she 
smiling because she is contented? Amused? 
Knows a good secret? When the world pre-
sents us with ambiguous input, rather than 
a blind eye, we often strive all the more to 
interpret its meaning (Long and Toppino, 
2004; Adolphs, 2006). Sometimes things 
are ambiguous because, without addi-
tional information, they are subject to 
multiple meanings. Other times, stimuli are 
ambiguous because they contain conflict-
ing elements. What if Da Vinci had written 
“sad” across Mona Lisa’s face, would your 
interpretation be initially dominated by 
the negative connotation of that label or 
the positive connotation of her smile? Is 
there anything really different about trying 
to inhibit your attention to the face com-
pared to the label? A recent study suggests 
the label would be processed more quickly 
than her facial expression and that at least 
partially distinct brain systems are needed 
to inhibit the influence of a face compared 
to a word in a final judgment. Ovaysikia 
et al. (2011) presented participants with 
stimuli that depicted facial expressions of 
emotion overwritten with emotion words 
that varied in congruence with the facial 
expressions (e.g., congruent stimuli might 
depict a smiling face overwritten with the 
word “happy” whereas incongruent  stimuli 
in ambiguous situations (Stenberg, 2009). 
Therefore, one might expect that by adult-
hood, the long-term interest and experience 
with face perception would prioritize atten-
tion to faces in favor of words. In fact, pre-
vious research has found that faces can be 
prioritized over words (Beall and Herbert, 
2008). Therefore, it was notable that par-
ticipants in the Ovaysikia et al. (2011) study 
were quicker to respond and made fewer 
errors when asked to attend to the emotion 
words compared to when they were asked 
to attend to the emotional faces. The fact 
that sometimes the face wins (Beall and 
Herbert, 2008) and sometimes the words 
win (Ovaysikia et al., 2011) suggests that 
conceptualizations of instinctual process-
ing should not necessarily be equated with 
automaticity.
The mixed findings about what “wins” in 
social perception also point to the impor-
tance of understanding how motivation and 
context influence interpretations of ambig-
uous social stimuli. Although research in 
other domains has begun to examine the 
influence of mindset on stimuli with con-
flicting meanings (e.g., Bhanji and Beer, in 
press), this approach is rarely adopted in 
current neuroscience research focused on 
understanding higher-order, social percep-
tions of faces or minds. Yet this perspec-
tive is important and ecologically valid. 
For example, the content of the emotion 
labels written across the emotional faces 
(Beall and Herbert, 2008; Ovaysikia et al., 
2011) could just as easily be represented by 
individuals’ motivations, expectations, or 
contexts. What neural regions are recruited 
to imbue ambiguous social stimuli with 
meaning on the basis of motivation or 
context? Very little research has addressed 
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and Kahneman, 1974). What is the rela-
tion between the neural regions associated 
with inhibiting the influence of an initial 
impression on judgment and the neural 
regions associated with adjusting initial 
impressions to account for new informa-
tion? In one case, control is expressed to 
inhibit the influence of a particular factor 
whereas in the other case, control is needed 
to weigh several factors in a final judgment. 
Future research should probe situations in 
which adjustment is used to make meaning 
out of ambiguous stimuli.
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